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Burden-sharing agreements :  
the cart before the horse ?
Introduction
Recent crisis episodes in the banking sector have empha-
sised both the importance of having sound crisis man-
agement policies in place and the role of authorities in 
developing  and  implementing  these  policies.  However, 
since  crises  tend  to  be  highly  complex  and  uncertain 
events,  developing  a  crisis  management  framework  is 
by no means simple, even in a purely domestic context. 
Conceiving a framework in a cross-border environment, 
in which several authorities will have to coordinate their 
actions, may be even more complex.(1)
Faced  with  these  challenges,  authorities  in  charge  of 
crisis  management  have  been  proactively  adapting  the 
European  crisis  management  framework.  For  instance, 
very recently, the EU authorities – namely finance min-
isters,  central  bank  governors  and  heads  of  supervi-
sory  authorities  –  have  agreed  on  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding on cooperation on cross-border financial 
stability.  This  Memorandum  of  Understanding  contains 
inter alia nine high-level principles for the management 
of  a  crisis  involving  at  least  one  cross-border  banking 
group at risk of being declared insolvent and with the 
potential to trigger a systemic crisis in another EU country 
(Council of the European Union (2007) and Council of the 
European Union (2008)).
These principles concern each of the different stages of 
crisis management. These stages are likely to vary with 
the crisis situation but, as shown in Chart 1, they usually 
comprise  an  assessment  of  the  systemic  nature  of  the 
crisis,  determination  of  a  crisis  resolution  policy  and 
implementation of the latter by domestic authorities. The 
assessment of the systemic nature of the crisis should be 
carried out promptly by the competent authorities and 
according to a common analytical framework (Principle 5). 
An optimal crisis resolution policy should be chosen so as 
to  minimise  any  potential  harmful  economic  impact  at 
the lowest overall cost (Principle 1) and its implementation 
should be coordinated between authorities (Principles 5 
and 7).
Chart 1 also raises the possibility of recourse to a poten-
tial  sharing  of  the  costs,  or  the  burden,  of  the  crisis. 
The resolution of a crisis can take several forms and, in 
principle,  private-sector  solutions  –  which  do  not  rely 
on public funds – should have the primacy (Principle 2). 
However, the recent past has again demonstrated that 
recourse to taxpayers’ money could not credibly be ruled 
out by authorities. For instance, the involvement of public 
funds in the rescue of IKB or Northern Rock was not only 
considered as a necessary step by authorities in charge of 
crisis management in Germany and the United Kingdom 
respectively, but also involved substantial resources. These 
crises  were  exclusively  domestic.  However,  the  steadily 
increasing presence in Europe of some very complex credit 
institutions which are integrated across national borders 
raises the likelihood of one day facing a crisis involving a 
cross-border bank. Therefore, Principles 3 and 4 relate to 
the sharing of the burden among different countries. 
Potential burden-sharing is only one stage in the cross-
border crisis management process and should therefore 
be clearly distinguished from the stages involving assess-
ment of the crisis, determination of the crisis resolution 
(1)  See, for example, Nguyen and Praet (2006) who discuss the different solutions 
that can be used to solve a banking crisis and the complexity associated with 
their implementation in both a domestic and cross-border context.
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policy, and implementation of this policy. Although the 
successive stages of the crisis resolution process are con-
ceptually distinct, the discussion of the burden-sharing 
should not be disconnected from the discussion on the 
crisis resolution policy, as they are intrinsically related. 
Indeed, the choice of the resolution policy determines 
the cost of the crisis and thus establishes the bases for 
the burden-sharing. Conversely, authorities’ preferences 
for  a  crisis  resolution  policy  will  be  influenced  in  the 
first instance by their expectations about the final cost 
allocation associated with it. These strong interlinkages 
between  the  burden-sharing  mechanism  on  the  one 
hand and the crisis resolution policy on the other hand 
illustrate  how  a  potential  burden-sharing  agreement 
could  affect  the  crisis  management  framework  and 
suggest that such an agreement is not neutral for crisis 
management. 
The burden-sharing theme has attracted a lot of attention 
from policy makers in recent times (see Fonteyne, 2007). 
However, there is still a wide divergence of views between 
the supporters of burden-sharing agreements and those 
who would be more hesitant or reluctant to accept to 
share the burden. The former argue that it is a necessary 
condition  for  authorities  to  internalise  the  cross-border 
consequences  of  their  actions.  The  latter  believe  that 
agreeing on burden-sharing entails moral hazard or may 
be premature (this debate between authorities in favour 
of and against burden-sharing agreements is very clearly 
exposed in e.g. IMF, 2007). 
Despite the fact that the debate in policy-making fora 
is  lively  and  intense,  the  literature  on  burden-sharing 
remains  relatively  scarce  and  deals  mainly  with  the 
different  rationales  behind  an  agreement  on  sharing 
the costs of a crisis or with the practical design of the 
burden-sharing scheme. The objective of this article is 
different as it does not discuss the desirability of such an 
agreement but rather aims at investigating the precon-
ditions that need to be fulfilled before a burden-sharing 
agreement can be put into practice. These conditions 
relate (i) to the necessary trust between authorities, (ii) 
to the coordination of the stages that precede the bur-
den-sharing and (iii) to the design of the burden-sharing 
scheme. 
The  remainder  of  this  article  is  organised  as  follows. 
Section 1 clarifies some concepts relating to burden-shar-
ing agreements. Section 2 discusses the conceptual condi-
tions that need to be met before a burden-sharing agree-
ment can be implemented. Section 3 goes deeper into 
one of these conditions, namely that the burden-sharing 
agreement  should  be  compatible  with  the  institutional 
environment. Finally, section 4 concludes.
1.  Clarification of concepts
The concept of burden-sharing agreement entails diffe-
rent dimensions. Clarifying them is particularly important 
as,  currently,  the  expression  burden-sharing  agreement 
CHART 1  SUCCESSIVE STAGES IN CROSS-BORDER CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Domestic assessment of the nature 
of the crisis by Country A
Domestic assessment of the nature 
of the crisis by Country B 
Joint assessment of the nature of the crisis by countries A and B 
Determination of a resolution policy by countries A and B 
Implementation of resolution 
policy by Country A 
Implementation of resolution 
policy by Country B 
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may be used to refer to various schemes with very differ-
ent features.  
First, some authors and policy makers use the concept 
of burden-sharing agreement to refer to an agreement 
between  different  countries  or  authorities  to  share  the 
burden of a crisis on the basis of a scheme to be deter-
mined ex post, after a crisis has arisen. The expression 
burden-sharing agreement has also been used to refer to 
an agreement to share the burden of a crisis according 
to a rule defined ex-ante, before a crisis has occurred. 
The difference between the first and the second concept 
is that, in the first case, the cost allocation is not prede-
termined, as authorities have an agreement to determine 
the cost allocation during or after the crisis. There is only 
an agreement on the principle of sharing the burden, but 
how the burden will actually be shared is not specified 
and participants have the flexibility to adapt the burden-
sharing to take account of crisis features that cannot be 
anticipated. In the second case, the authorities devise ex-
ante a burden-sharing rule which predetermines the cost 
allocation. In the context of this article, we will use the 
term agreement on a burden-sharing principle to refer to 
the first kind of agreement, and the term agreement on a 
burden-sharing rule will refer to the second.  (1)
The  principles  of  the  Council  of  the  European  Union 
(2007) are apparently based on a burden-sharing princi-
ple. Indeed, the fourth principle for cross-border financial 
crisis management establishes that, in resolving a crisis 
involving  a  cross-border  bank,  “if  public  resources  are 
involved,  direct  budgetary  net  costs  are  shared  among 
affected  Member  States  on  the  basis  of  equitable  and 
balanced criteria, which take into account the economic 
impact  of  the  crisis  in  the  countries  affected  and  the 
framework  of  home  and  host  countries’  supervisory 
powers”. Although the principle identifies relevant criteria 
to determine the final cost allocation, it does not impose 
any rigid rule that would apply to all Member States, or 
to all types of crisis.  (2)
A burden-sharing rule is the type of agreement that under-
lies e.g. the contribution of Goodhart and Schoenmaker 
(2008),  in  which  they  discuss  several  methods  first  to 
finance a burden-sharing agreement and then to redis-
tribute  the  costs  according  to  a  predetermined  key 
between participating Member States, either through a 
general fund or through specific agreements.
A second dimension that differentiates between the terms 
of a potential burden-sharing agreement refers to the def-
inition of the actual burden, e.g. to the nature of what is 
being shared. A narrow definition of the burden is the net 
direct budgetary costs that a specific country or a group 
of countries will have to bear to solve a crisis. This defini-
tion focuses on the direct costs and includes, for instance, 
the costs of recapitalisation of the bank in difficulty or 
the costs associated with other forms of public interven-
tions, such as costs associated with potential guarantees 
for which no flow of cash can be directly observed. The 
net budgetary costs also take into account the potential 
direct revenues that may result from the management of 
a banking crisis. They include, for instance, flows arising 
from the sale of (part of the) assets of the ailing bank or 
from the payments of dividends by the bank. 
A broader definition of the burden also exists. This defi-
nition refers to the total welfare losses which a specific 
country or a group of countries affected by a crisis incurs. 
This  definition  differs  in  at  least  two  ways  from  the   
first – narrower – definition :
−    it  includes  the  net  direct  budgetary  costs  associated 
with a crisis but also the economic impact of the crisis. 
Ideally, it should capture all the losses – present and 
future – resulting from the externalities associated with 
a banking crisis. These externalities concern the finan-
cial  sector  (e.g.  through  disruptions  in  payment  sys-
tems, contagion on the interbank market or a general 
loss of confidence in the financial sector), as well as the 
non-financial system (e.g. through the loss of informa-
tion on borrowers due to a bank failure or a potential 
rationing of credit that would follow a banking crisis). 
It could be broadly captured by the present and future 
GDP losses incurred as a result of the crisis. 
−    in the broad definition of costs, the total burden of the 
crisis results from a difference – that between the wel-
fare of a country (or a subset of countries) in a normal 
situation and in a crisis situation – while the narrow 
definition of costs considers only cash flows that are 
directly or indirectly observable. The broad definition 
thus implies the need to calculate a hypothetical situa-
tion and to compare it with an actual one.
Given  the  difficulties  associated  with  calculating  the 
burden in the broad definition of costs, the word burden 
is commonly used to designate the direct net budgetary 
costs. For instance, the approach privileged by the Council 
of the European Union (2007), as illustrated by the fourth 
principle  quoted  above,  rests  on  the  narrow  definition 
of  the  burden.  In  economic  terms,  however,  there  is 
(1)  In the context of this paper, the term burden-sharing agreement is used 
generically to designate all kinds of agreements on burden sharing, including 
agreements on a burden-sharing principle and agreements on a burden-sharing 
rule. 
(2)  The Council of the European Union (2007) also “encourages authorities (...) 
that share financial stability concerns to start developing, as soon as possible, 
voluntary cooperation agreements consistent with the extended EU wide MoU 
and building on cross-border supervisory arrangements for crisis prevention. 
These agreements would focus on the principles and procedures in detail – taking 
into account particular needs of crisis management in a specific cross-border 
context”. 122
no reason to separate the direct costs from the indirect 
welfare losses – especially as they may be, to a certain 
extent, substitutable.(1) Therefore, some authors, such as 
Freixas (2003), use the broader definition.(2) The practical 
implication of the choice between the two definitions will 
be discussed in Section 3 of this paper. 
2.    Conditions for the functioning of 
burden-sharing agreements
While considerable thought has been given to the poten-
tial need for crisis burden-sharing among countries and 
to  the  aim  of  burden-sharing  agreements,  to  the  best 
of  our  knowledge,  almost  no  discussion  has  focused 
on the conditions that must be fulfilled in order for any 
such agreement − whether in the form of a principle or 
a rule − to succeed.(3) This section identifies a number of 
preconditions  that  supervisory  and  crisis-management 
frameworks must satisfy if a burden-sharing agreement 
is to be successfully implemented. These conditions fall 
into three categories : general conditions, conditions relat-
ing to crisis assessment and determination of the crisis 
resolution policy, and conditions relating directly to the 
burden-sharing agreement. 
2.1    General conditions : mutual trust between 
authorities participating in the agreement
Trust is an important aspect that should not be underes-
timated in a burden-sharing process. Indeed, authorities 
will  only  be  willing  to  cooperate  in  a  burden-sharing 
agreement if they fully trust their counterparts in foreign 
countries. A lack of trust, on the other hand, may hinder 
the cooperation that is necessary to resolve a crisis and to 
implement a burden-sharing agreement. 
For instance, because supervision and crisis management 
are closely interrelated, a lack of trust by one authority in 
the supervisory structure in some foreign countries may 
impede the signing of a burden-sharing agreement with 
these  countries.  Indeed,  if  an  authority  considers  that 
some form of risk is not adequately monitored by one 
of its potential counterparties in a burden-sharing agree-
ment and that the lack of monitoring is likely to increase 
the probability of default of a given bank, this authority 
may be reluctant to commit ex-ante to sharing the burden 
of a crisis involving this bank. Similarly, an authority may 
be unwilling to share confidential information or to com-
municate crisis assessments if it believes that counterpar-
ties may use the information inappropriately or disclose it. 
Mutual trust is therefore necessary to ensure cooperation 
between authorities in case of crisis.
In this context, authorities that are willing to implement 
a  burden-sharing  agreement  should  examine  current 
cooperative procedures – including, in Europe, the con-
solidating  supervisor  structure  proposed  in  the  Capital 
Requirements  Directive  and  the  colleges  of  supervisors, 
as well as cooperation procedures between central banks 
and ministries of finance – to make sure that the proce-
dures used are sufficiently robust to guarantee the neces-
sary trust among authorities.
2.2    Conditions relating to the assessment and 
determination of crisis resolution policy
2.2.1    Agreement on the general objective of crisis 
management
Agreement on the objective of crisis management is nec-
essary in order to agree on a crisis resolution policy and, 
therefore, on burden-sharing. In principle, the objective 
of an authority managing a purely domestic crisis is to 
minimise the domestic welfare losses. Similarly, in a cross-
border setting, as recognised in the first principle of the 
Council of the European Union (2007), the objective of 
the authorities in charge of crisis management should be 
to minimise the global welfare losses.  (4) The crisis resolu-
tion policy that keeps global welfare losses to a minimum 
will be referred to in the remainder of this article as the 
optimal (crisis) resolution policy.
While authorities in Europe seem to have an agreement to 
minimise global welfare losses, the practical scope of such 
a principle may actually be quite limited. Indeed, calculat-
ing welfare losses is a complex operation, especially when 
it has to be done for various hypothetical scenarios involv-
ing different resolution policies. In practice, it is doubtful 
whether anyone, in the current environment, could prove 
that the principle had not been respected, except possibly 
in situations where one or several authorities had blatantly 
acted at the expense of others. Therefore, authorities may 
not feel completely bound by an agreement to minimise 
global welfare losses. 
(1)  Note that they may not be perfectly substitutable in a cross-border environment. 
For instance, there may be situations in which welfare losses in one country will 
only be avoided through a direct budgetary intervention in another country. 
(2)  Freixas (2003), however, makes a distinction between the social benefit of a 
bailout and its direct costs.
(3)  One exception is Fonteyne (2008).
(4)  The first principle of the Council of the European Union (2007) states that “The 
objective of crisis management is to protect the stability of the financial system in 
all countries involved and in the EU as a whole and to minimise potential harmful 
economic impacts at the lowest overall collective cost. (...)”. 123
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Despite the fact that such an agreement will never be per-
fect, it is necessary to have broad political consensus on 
the fact that crisis resolution has no other primary objec-
tive. Indeed, part of the legitimacy of a burden-sharing 
agreement will stem from the fact that it allows the imple-
mentation of a resolution policy that may be more costly 
for some authorities but that is the least costly for society 
as a whole. Note that a complete and precise calculation 
of welfare losses is not necessary to identify the optimal 
policy. Indeed, it is only necessary to be able to accurately 
rank the different potential policies. However, in situations 
where  the  burden-sharing  scheme  is  based  on  welfare 
losses, a precise calculation of the welfare losses will be 
necessary. 
Therefore,  if  authorities  want  to  implement  a  burden-
sharing  agreement  based  on  welfare  losses,  or  if  they 
want to improve the crisis management framework, they 
should strive to remove the imperfections associated with 
the principle of minimising global welfare losses. In other 
words, they should develop and agree on a common ana-
lytical framework  (1), on models and on a methodology to 
assess the global welfare losses associated with a crisis, on 
a structure to ensure that welfare losses are correctly and 
independently  calculated  and  then  truthfully  reported, 
and they should also put in place mechanisms that allow 
verification of compliance by authorities with this princi-
ple. These measures would also render the principle more 
operational and thus more binding.   
2.2.2    Common opinion on the optimal crisis resolution 
policy
Another condition, linked to the previous one, relates to 
the need for authorities to form a common opinion on the 
crisis resolution policy. Indeed, there is unlikely to be any 
burden-sharing if, at the beginning of the crisis, authori-
ties disagree on the way it should be solved. 
In  order  to  reach  a  common  opinion  on  crisis  resolu-
tion  policy,  it  appears  essential  to  first  proceed  with  a 
common assessment of the nature of the crisis. We refer 
to a common assessment as the process through which 
authorities jointly determine the nature of a cross-border 
crisis  or  through  which  they  exchange  their  individual 
assessments. The common assessment should therefore 
reflect an appreciation of the consequences of the crisis 
in each of the countries involved. Similarly, the impact in 
each country of the different potential corrective meas-
ures should also be evaluated. This common assessment 
should  warrant  due  recognition  of  cross-border  exter-
nalities,  and  therefore  may  require  information  sharing 
between cross-border authorities, prior to and during the 
crisis.  The  expected  result  of  the  common  assessment 
would  be  a  common  understanding  of  the  potential 
breadth and severity of the crisis, which could then serve 
as an input for the formulation of a coordinated commu-
nication plan and policy response.
The  speed  at  which  this  assessment  is  delivered  and 
the  common  understanding  reached  is  crucial.  Indeed, 
as crises tend to be races against the clock, the assess-
ment  must  lead  to  a  common  opinion  on  the  optimal 
crisis  resolution  policy  in  a  very  short  space  of  time. 
At  present,  there  is  no  such  mechanism  to  ensure  the 
formulation of a common opinion on the resolution of 
the crisis. This puts high uncertainty on the outcome of 
any burden-sharing agreement that may have previously 
been negotiated, since authorities are unlikely to share 
a burden if they disagree on the resolution policy that 
should  be  implemented.  Therefore,  authorities  wishing 
to  implement  a  burden-sharing  agreement  should  first 
investigate whether it is possible and desirable to develop 
a framework for developing a common opinion on crisis 
resolution. If such a framework is desired, it should be 
made operational before the burden-sharing agreement 
is addressed and/or negotiated. If such a framework is 
not desirable or not possible, the consequences for the 
burden-sharing mechanism of potential disagreement on 
crisis resolution should be carefully reviewed.
2.3    Conditions relating to the burden-sharing 
agreement
2.3.1    Legality of a pre-commitment on burden-sharing. 
When  authorities  in  one  country  agree  on  burden-
  sharing, they pre-commit public funds, as they declare 
their willingness to share the cost of a crisis with some 
foreign  authorities.  Although  this  allocation  of  public 
funds remains uncertain and contingent on the occur-
rence of a crisis, authorities in some countries may have 
to adapt their domestic legal frameworks if they want 
to pre-commit to a burden-sharing mechanism. In addi-
tion, in order to be legal, a pre-commitment on burden-
sharing may be subject to special procedures and may 
require domestic parliamentary approval. However, the 
publicity  associated  with  such  parliamentary  approval 
could  increase  the  extent  to  which  moral  hazard  is 
present in the system. 
(1)  Note that the Council of the European Union (2007) specifies that authorities 
have already agreed on a “common analytical framework for the assessment 
of systemic implications of a potential crisis to ensure the use of common 
terminology in assessing the systemic implications of a cross-border financial crisis 
by all relevant authorities ; and to enhance the availability of timely assessments 
among authorities that will facilitate the decision making in a crisis situation”.124
2.3.2    Binding burden-sharing transfers
For a burden-sharing mechanism to succeed, it must be 
both credible and enforceable. Otherwise, the mechanism 
may not be taken into account by the different authori-
ties and may thus not fulfil its role. For instance, if burden 
transfers are not enforceable, some authorities may lack 
the incentives to cooperate in implementing the optimal 
crisis resolution policy. This would be the case, for exam-
ple, if implementing this policy were to raise the costs 
borne by one authority relative to the costs in the absence 
of burden-sharing.
Yet,  the  mere  fact  that  burden-sharing  transfers  must 
be preceded by a common assessment of the crisis and 
a common opinion on the optimal resolution policy, e.g. 
by a process that is uncertain (as authorities may act in 
bad  faith),  illustrates  how  difficult  it  may  be  to  find  a 
mechanism  that  would  guarantee  enforcement  of  bur-
den-sharing transfers. Moreover, it may be challenging to 
simultaneously ensure effective enforcement of promised 
transfers  and  the  confidentiality  necessary  to  maintain 
some constructive ambiguity regarding the use of public 
funds. Potential enforcement mechanisms would include, 
for  instance,  mediation  mechanisms,  reputation  risk  or 
litigation, but most of these would imply disclosing the 
details  of  the  burden-sharing  agreement.  Another  pos-
sibility  would  be  to  make  the  implementation  of  the 
optimal resolution policy conditional on burden transfers 
which would have to take place simultaneously. However, 
this may be difficult in practice.  
Despite  the  difficulties  associated  with  enforcement  of 
burden-sharing  transfers,  authorities  wishing  to  imple-
ment such an agreement should be capable of ensuring 
that eventual burden transfers can be effectively enforced. 
Yet, the chosen enforcement mechanism is likely to have 
an  impact  on  the  general  institutional  framework.  The 
optimal  mechanism  for  enforcing  burden  transfers,  its 
legal  consequences  and  its  effect  on  the  institutional 
framework should therefore be further investigated and 
fully  specified  by  authorities  willing  to  enter  into  a   
burden-sharing agreement.
2.3.3    Compatibility between the objective of the 
burden-sharing agreement and the institutional 
environment
A  burden-sharing  agreement  could  have  several  objec-
tives.  First,  it  may  serve  as  a  coordination  device  that 
would facilitate implementation of the optimal crisis reso-
lution policy. Since the behaviour of the different authori-
ties is determined by the incentives they face, changing 
some of these incentives could modify their reactions to 
the crisis and their willingness to adopt particular resolu-
tion policies. A well-conceived burden-sharing agreement 
could  then  serve  to  align  the  interests  of  the  different 
authorities  and  to  modify  their  behaviour  in  order  to 
enhance their cooperation. 
A  second  reason  for  modifying  the  distribution  of  the 
costs  of  a  crisis  relates  to  the  allocation  of  powers 
between  authorities  and  the  realisation  that  a  burden-
sharing  agreement  can  affect  authorities’  behaviour  in 
normal,  as  well  as  crisis,  times.  Home  countries  have 
responsibility for the supervision of foreign branches (with 
the  important  exception  of  the  supervision  of  liquidity, 
which is the responsibility of host authorities) and host 
authorities have responsibility for the supervision of the 
subsidiaries they host. Although cross-border crisis man-
agement responsibilities are not clearly defined, current 
perceptions of these responsibilities tend to follow from 
the  supervisory  duties  (see,  for  example,  Nguyen  and 
Praet,  2006).  Because  of  the  relationship  between  the 
supervisory and the crisis-management frameworks, the 
final cost allocation in an eventual crisis will not only influ-
ence the way authorities behave in the crisis but will also 
indirectly affect the incentives they face in normal times. 
A third potential objective of a burden-sharing agreement 
is to allocate crisis costs according to a principle of “fair-
ness” or some other mutually-accepted criterion.
These  three  objectives  may  sometimes  have  conflicting 
implications and it may not always be possible to pursue 
them  simultaneously.  In  particular,  the  type  of  burden-
sharing agreement (principle- or rule-based) that can be 
successfully  implemented  and  the  ultimate  objective  of 
the agreement will depend crucially upon the institutional 
environment,  namely  whether  the  optimal  resolution 
policy can be independently enforced or not.(1) The link 
between the institutional framework, the objective of the 
burden-sharing  agreement  and  the  type  of  agreement 
that should be chosen is analysed in section 3. As will be 
shown, incompatibility between the institutional environ-
ment  and  the  type  of  burden-sharing  agreement  can 
render the agreement ineffective or could even distort the 
choice of crisis resolution policy. 
(1)  Note that, as will be explained in section 3, we establish a difference between 
the enforceability of the optimal resolution policy – e.g. the possibility to ensure 
that authorities in charge of crisis management implement the collectively 
optimal resolution policy – and the enforceability of the burden transfers – e.g. 
the possibility to force authorities that are part of a burden-sharing agreement 
to effectively transfer funds calculated in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. 125
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3.    Burden-sharing and enforcement of 
the optimal resolution policy
As suggested above, the institutional framework plays a 
key role in burden-sharing and even determines the type 
of  burden-sharing  agreement  (principle-  or  rule-based) 
which is feasible. Hence, the choice of the type of agree-
ment will depend on the institutional set-up. Two cases 
need to be differentiated, relating to the extent to which 
it is possible to independently enforce the optimal crisis 
resolution  policy.(1)  The  first  case  is  one  in  which  there 
is no institutional structure that would make it possible 
for authorities to enforce the optimal resolution policy. 
In this situation, authorities must voluntarily implement 
the policy themselves, and they will agree to participate 
in the solution that is collectively optimal only if it is not 
contrary to their domestic interests. The second case is 
one in which it is possible to enforce the optimal resolu-
tion policy.(2)
The  objective  of  the  burden-sharing  agreement  will  be 
different in the two cases. When the optimal resolution 
policy cannot be independently enforced, the crisis resolu-
tion policy has to be self-enforcing. As will be explained 
in section 3.1, the design of the cost-sharing agreement 
may  help  to  ensure  this.  Indeed,  the  burden-sharing 
scheme will influence the incentives of authorities to act, 
as these incentives are influenced by the final allocation 
of the costs of the crisis. The burden-sharing agreement 
needs to be used as a coordination device to ensure that 
authorities will implement the optimal resolution policy ; 
therefore,  an  agreement  on  a  burden-sharing  principle 
must be used. In such a situation, it would not be possible 
to define an ex-ante burden-sharing rule that would be 
compatible with all possible crises and optimal policies. 
Burden transfers need to be determined jointly with the 
optimal  resolution  policy.  While  the  rule  governing  the 
transfers cannot be determined ex-ante, authorities can   
nevertheless  commit  ex-ante  to  the  principle  of  initiat-
ing discussions on the burden-sharing once a crisis has 
erupted.(3) 
Conversely, as will be discussed in section 3.2, when the 
optimal crisis resolution policy can be enforced externally, 
the burden-sharing agreement no longer needs to act as 
a coordination device and can play another role. Actually, 
the fact that the optimal resolution policy can be enforced 
without being affected by the final cost allocation discon-
nects  the  burden-sharing  from  the  determination  and 
implementation of the optimal resolution policy. Thanks 
to this disconnection, the cost allocation can be deter-
mined independently of the crisis resolution policy. It is 
then  possible  to  define  a  cost-sharing  rule  before  the 
determination of the optimal policy response.(4)
3.1    Burden-sharing principle : when the optimal 
crisis resolution policy can not be externally 
enforced. 
There  are  some  situations  where,  in  the  absence  of  a 
burden-sharing mechanism, authorities cannot simultane-
ously maximise their own welfare and collectively mini-
mise the global welfare losses. For instance, ring fencing 
by some domestic authorities in a banking crisis situation 
may  constitute  a  guarantee  against  domestic  welfare 
losses but may at the same time impede a solution that 
would  be  globally  more  favourable.  When  the  optimal 
crisis  resolution  policy  cannot  be  externally  enforced 
– in the example, if no one can prevent ring fencing by 
domestic authorities – the burden-sharing agreement can 
be used as a coordination device to ensure that authorities 
naturally cooperate and apply the optimal crisis resolu-
tion  policy.  An  appropriate  sharing  of  the  burden  can 
indeed guarantee that authorities are better off if they 
cooperate. 
In order to accomplish this, one condition needs to be 
satisfied, namely that parties will be willing to implement 
the  collectively  optimal  resolution  policy  in  situations 
where they cannot achieve a better outcome alone, or in 
any coalition with one or more other authorities. In such 
situations, authorities do not have any incentive to imple-
ment another crisis resolution policy, as no coalition could 
improve the welfare of all its members on its own. This 
property ensures that the optimal crisis resolution policy 
is self-enforcing.(5) 
To  satisfy  this  property,  the  burden-sharing  mechanism 
can  be  used  as  a  way  of  reallocating  welfare  losses 
between authorities to guarantee that no single author-
ity is worse off if it implements the resolution policy that 
(1)  Note that, as discussed in Section 2, the enforcement of the optimal resolution 
policy also supposes that there is a mechanism that can determine what the 
optimal policy is, how it can be reached and can verify that authorities effectively 
implement this policy.
(2)  It is beyond the scope of this article to investigate how the optimal resolution 
policy can be enforced. However, one could imagine several procedures or 
architectures that would help to enforce the optimal solution. These procedures 
and mechanisms may rely on very different structures that may be decentralised 
or centralised and that may involve, for instance, changing the mandate 
of domestic authorities, implementing mechanisms ensuring mandatory 
coordination, or establishing a coordinating authority in charge of crisis 
management. See also Fonteyne (2008).
(3)  One may nevertheless wonder why an ex-ante agreement on a burden-sharing 
principle would be necessary if authorities can agree on this principle once a 
crisis situation arises. Two reasons may justify an ex-ante agreement. Such an 
agreement may be needed if it has some implications on how the cooperation is 
organised in normal times, or if authorities want to put in place an operational 
framework for organise the burden sharing, which would have to be improvised 
if there were no ex-ante agreement.  
(4)  Note that while the agreement on a burden-sharing rule and the agreement on 
a burden-sharing principle differ on the extent to which they can be applied in 
situations where the optimal crisis resolution policy can be enforced or not, they 
both rely on the assumption that transfers resulting from the burden sharing can 
be enforced.
(5)  This solution concept is most often referred to as the “core” in cooperative game 
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minimises the global welfare losses. The burden-sharing 
mechanism can be compared to a compensation mecha-
nism :  authorities  that  profit  from  the  adoption  of  the 
optimal resolution policy compensate those who would 
be  worse  off  after  its  implementation,  implying  some 
form of monetary transfers between countries.  
Since,  in  theory,  authorities  have  the  choice  between 
cooperating  in  the  optimal  resolution  policy  or  not 
cooperating,  they  will  compare  their  welfare  losses  in 
each situation. The welfare losses incurred if they do not 
cooperate will thus constitute a natural benchmark that 
will influence the final allocation of costs in the event of 
cooperation. This allocation (and the subsequent burden 
transfers) has to be determined jointly with the optimal 
resolution policy. The costs involved for an authority in 
the case of non-cooperation will establish a ceiling on the 
amount of costs that can be allocated to that authority via 
the burden-sharing mechanism. 
When there is an agreement on a burden-sharing princi-
ple, a necessary – but not sufficient in itself – condition 
to make sure that no authority can improve its welfare, 
either alone or in a coalition, is that the crisis resolution 
policy adopted by the players minimises the total welfare 
losses. Indeed, when authorities can freely transfer funds 
to compensate for welfare losses, any resolution policy 
that would not keep welfare losses to a minimum could 
be improved upon by one or more authorities without 
affecting the welfare of the others. This is because, by 
definition, the optimal resolution policy – compared to a 
policy that is not optimal – will be less costly, generating 
a global surplus.  (1) All authorities can then be made better 
off if, starting from a cost allocation with a non-optimal 
policy, the surplus, or part of the surplus from the optimal 
policy, is reallocated to one or more of them. Therefore, 
a resolution policy that does not minimise global welfare 
losses resulting from the crisis can be improved upon for 
one or more authorities without being detrimental to the 
others.  (2)    
(1)  The global surplus is defined as the difference between the welfare losses when 
authorities do not cooperate in implementing a resolution policy and the losses in 
the optimal solution e.g. in the solution minimising the losses.
(2)  Note that this condition does not hold in absence of a burden-sharing 
mechanism. When there is no agreement to share the burden of the crisis, 
authorities are not necessarily better off if they minimise the global surplus.  
When the burden of the crisis can be fully shared, however, any solution  
that would not be based on the optimal resolution policy could be strictly 
improved. The presence of a sound burden-sharing mechanism determined jointly 
with the crisis resolution policy will thus constitute a natural incentive to adopt 
the optimal resolution policy.  
Box 1  –  Burden-sharing : a numerical example
Table 1 presents a simplified numerical example of a situation in which burden-sharing can help reach a solution 
that minimises the global welfare losses. The table gives the total welfare losses that three countries (A, B and C) 
have to incur to solve a crisis, as well as the transfers that are necessary to ensure cooperation. The last column of 
the table gives the global welfare losses, which are defined as the sum of the individual welfare losses in country A, 
B and C. The parameters α, β and γ represent the shares of the surplus from cooperation that are allocated to 
countries A, B and C respectively. These values are determined via the burden-sharing scheme. 
In the example, in the first outcome, “No cooperation”, in which authorities individually maximise their domestic 
welfare, the total welfare losses amount to 26. When authorities in the three countries cooperate, the total welfare 
losses fall, from 26 to 23. However, the allocation of the losses is also modified. The welfare losses in country A 
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No cooperation  ............................ 10 15 1 26
Cooperation before burden transfers  ..........   5 10 8 23
Cooperation after burden transfers   ............ 10 – A (26 – 23) 15 – B (26 – 23)    1 – G (26 – 23) 23
Implied transfers   ............................   5 – A (26 – 23)   5 – B (26 – 23) – 7 – G (26 – 23) 3 (1 – A – B – G)
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and B are respectively reduced by 5 while losses in country C are raised significantly as they jump from 1 to 8. This 
reflects the fact that some positive externalities are created by the behaviour of C. Note that countries A and B 
cannot implement the cooperative solution on their own, as it also requires the active cooperation of country C. 
This situation could arise, for example, if country C does not suffer much from the crisis but is the only authority 
that can intervene to stop it. For instance, this would be the case if the ailing bank were incorporated in country C 
where it would not be systemic and operating in country A and B where it would be. 
In the absence of an agreement  on a  burden-sharing principle, country C would not have any incentive to 
provide assistance to the ailing bank, as the cost it would have to bear would exceed the costs it faces in the 
non-cooperative outcome. However, if country C were internalising the cross-border consequences of its actions, 
it would intervene. 
An appropriate burden-sharing agreement makes the cooperative solution profitable for the three countries, since 
the implementation of the crisis resolution policy that minimises global welfare losses generates a surplus of 3. As 
is shown in the last line of the table, starting from the allocation (10, 15, 1) of welfare costs in the non-cooperative 
solution and allocating proportions (α, β and γ) of the surplus to the three authorities, respectively, could benefit 
each of the three countries.
The only conditions that apply to α, β and γ, in this case, are that their sum should be equal to 1, with α, β and γ 
positive.(1) The net welfare transfers between authorities that would be necessary to guarantee that their incentives 
are aligned when implementing the optimal crisis resolution policy would amount to (5 – α (26-23)) from country A   
to country C, to (5 – β (26-23)) from country B to country C, and to (–7 – γ (26-23)) for country C. Note that, 
since costs are transferred, an increase (decrease) in costs is equivalent to a decrease (increase) in welfare. Taking 
into account the fact that α, β and γ lie between 0 and 1, the transfers will lie in the following intervals : [2 ; 5] for 
country A, [2 ; 5] for country B and [–10 ; –7] for country C. Indeed, country C must receive monetary compensation 
of at least 7 if it is to be better off than in the non-cooperative solution. Country C can receive up to 10 if it captures 
the whole surplus. Countries A and B can transfer a maximum of 5 each, as otherwise they would prefer the non-
cooperative solution. Given that C must receive at least 7, the minimum that either A or B could transfer is 2.
Within these intervals, many different solutions (e.g. many different values of α, β and γ ) are feasible. The values 
that will actually be chosen will depend on the nature of the negotiations between the three countries, which, 
as shown in the example above, can be conceptualised as a game. For instance, a fairly standard concept in the 
literature on cooperative games is the Shapley value. The Shapley value aims at determining a “fair” allocation of 
the gains from cooperation – in this case, the surplus generated as a result of implementing the optimal resolution 
policy – and assigns a single allocation of costs to a given cost-sharing game. The allocation is determined by the 
importance of the contributions to total costs of each player in the game and is a linear function of the marginal 
contribution of each player in all possible coalitions between the players. 
The bargaining solution is another solution concept that could be applied to determine the final allocation of the 
surplus. The surplus from cooperation would be distributed in a manner reflecting the bargaining strength of   
the  different  authorities.  This  bargaining  power  will  depend  upon  the  characteristics  of  the  negotiations, 
together with the knowledge that each authority has the possibility to stop bargaining, which would lead to the 
“disagreement outcome”.  
Finally, players may also want to take account of external criteria to split the surplus. These criteria – specific to 
banking crisis management – may resemble those that could be used in an ex-ante rule and that are discussed in 
section 3.2. The difference with an ex-ante rule, however, derives from the fact that the cost allocation would be 
determined after the crisis has arisen, taking into account the incentives of the different authorities. 
(1)  Note that, as already explained, it appears difficult to determine α, β and γ – or more generally, the extent of transfers -before the crisis arises and as long as its 
features remain unknown.128
Although  the  above  discussion  has  assumed  that  the 
burden-sharing scheme will be based on welfare losses, 
the real world is more complex, and the implementation 
of the optimal crisis resolution policy may not be possible. 
Indeed, as was discussed in Section 2, it is very difficult 
to  calculate  the  welfare  losses  associated  with  a  crisis. 
Therefore, in the current context, countries are unlikely 
to transfer funds to compensate for these indirect costs. 
Moreover, even if authorities were capable of calculating 
their own domestic welfare losses and willing to share 
these costs, they may lack the incentives to report their 
welfare losses truthfully (see Freixas, 2003), especially if 
their report influences the ultimate burden transfers.
Since it is not currently possible to determine individual 
and global welfare losses with any certainty, authorities 
willing  to  engage  in  a  burden-sharing  agreement  will 
most  likely  want  to  consider  a  proxy  for  total  welfare 
losses. This proxy may be the net direct budgetary costs. 
However,  these  costs  may  diverge  from  the  total  wel-
fare losses. In addition, as shown in Box 2, limiting the 
transfers to direct costs may imply that it is impossible 
to induce authorities to cooperate in implementing the 
optimal resolution policy ; therefore, this policy may not 
be feasible.  
Box 2  –    Discrepancies between welfare losses and direct budgetary costs :  
a numerical example
The fact that total welfare losses may not be perfectly transferable may render the implementation of the optimal 
crisis resolution policy impossible. Table 2 presents a simplified numerical example in which two countries (A and 
B) face a banking crisis. Country A hosts the subsidiary of a bank that is incorporated in country B. The subsidiary 
in A is in difficulty while the parent company could survive on its own if country B ringfences its assets. The ailing 
bank is systemic in country A but not in country B. 
When the two countries do not cooperate, the global welfare losses amount to 110. These 110 are divided 
between country A and country B. Country A suffers the most from the crisis as its total welfare losses would 
amount to 100 following the default of the subsidiary. Country B’s losses are limited to 10 as the bank could 
survive independently in country B if assets were ringfence. 
If authorities cooperate, global welfare losses can be reduced to 61. Cooperation would imply that country B does 
not ringfence the assets of the bank incorporated in its country, to implement a solution that would be based 
on the group as a whole. The solution may for instance necessitate transfers of liquidity or capital from the bank 
in country B to its subsidiary in country A. However, this may subsequently raise the bank’s default probability in 
country B. This higher default probability worsens the position of the bank’s creditors in that country, together 
with the position of the deposit insurance scheme and consequently triggers a decrease in the general welfare of 
the country. Welfare costs thus increase from 10 to 11. Stopping to ringfence assets would thus exclusively benefit 
country A as it would allow it to reduce its welfare losses from 100 to 40. Let us assume that the optimal solution 
requires an additional budgetary intervention from country A amounting to 10.
While the cooperative crisis resolution policy minimises the sum of welfare and budgetary costs and is consequently 
optimal, this solution becomes impossible to implement if only the budgetary costs are shared. Indeed, in such 
a case, country B does not have to bear any budgetary costs but only welfare losses. In other words, even if 
country A supports the whole budgetary burden, country B will not agree to implement the cooperative solution 
as it would entail an increase in welfare losses. In such a situation, implementing the optimal crisis resolution policy 
is only possible if country A and country B accept to share welfare losses as well. 
However, as argued above, the difficulty of identifying welfare losses and implementing mechanisms that ensure 
welfare losses are truthfully reported (for instance, country B could also claim to have incurred welfare losses in 
excess of 11 without country A being able to verify this assertion) may constitute a huge obstacle to the sharing 
of these losses.
4129
burdEN-ShariNg agrEEmENTS : ThE CarT bEFOrE ThE hOrSE ?
3.2    Burden-sharing rule : when the optimal crisis 
resolution policy can be externally enforced.
Unlike  in  the  previous  section,  where  the  institutional 
structure is such that the optimal resolution policy can be 
externally enforced, the final cost allocation (and, there-
fore,  the  burden-sharing  scheme)  can  be  disconnected 
from the choice of the optimal crisis resolution policy. In 
this case, it is possible for authorities to sign an ex-ante 
agreement on a burden-sharing rule, and the authorities 
are free to determine a set of criteria, or a rule, that will 
guide the allocation of the total costs. For instance, the 
rule could allocate costs according to normative criteria, 
such as “fairness” or “solidarity”. 
Entering  a  normative  debate  on  the  burden  allocation 
may, however, prove to be difficult and even misleading. 
Indeed, “fairness” and “solidarity” are relative concepts 
that could be interpreted differently by different authori-
ties. This is true in normal times but may become even 
more apparent in a period of crisis in which authorities 
would be tempted to defend their own domestic inter-
ests.  Therefore,  the  “fairness”  or  “solidarity”  concepts 
should  be  clarified  beforehand,  and  authorities  should 
come to an agreement on their meaning and on the cri-
teria which conform to the meaning.(1) The final burden-
sharing rule could actually be based on a series of criteria 
reflecting different considerations. Criteria that have been 
suggested by policy makers or academics fall into three 
different  categories :  those  linked  to  the  allocation  of 
responsibilities  and  powers  between  authorities ;  those 
reflecting countries’ general features ; and those specifi-
cally linked to the ailing credit institution.    
The Council of the European Union (2007) suggests that 
authorities may want to consider the respective respon-
sibilities of the home and host authorities in the occur-
rence of the crisis.(2) To the extent that the supervisory 
framework may influence the circumstances of the crisis, 
it could be reflected in the rule too. There may also be 
another  more  fundamental  reason  to  take  account  of 
the supervisory framework. Although it is true that the 
burden-sharing  is  disconnected  from  the  management 
of the crisis in cases where the optimal crisis resolution 
policy can be enforced, the burden-sharing rule will nev-
ertheless influence the behaviour of authorities in normal 
times. Therefore, the rule needs to be consistent with the 
incentives that one wants to give to authorities in charge 
of banking supervision in normal times.
The rule may also reflect some country-specific features 
such as, for instance, the capacity of the country to con-
tribute to the burden-sharing or the importance of the 
financial system in the country. The GDP of the country 
could be used as a proxy for its financial capacity.(3) This 
is proposed by Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2008), who 









Welfare losses (excluding budgetary costs)  .................. 100 10 110
Budgetary costs  ......................................... 0 0 0
Total welfare losses  ...................................... 100 10 110
Cooperation before burden transfers
Welfare losses (excluding budgetary costs)  .................. 40 11 51
Budgetary costs  ......................................... 10 0 10
Total welfare losses  ...................................... 50 11 61
 
(1)  Besides choosing the variables of the rule, authorities will also have to decide 
whether a “fair” rule should be based on a general fund and apply to all 
countries participating in the burden-sharing agreement or on a specific fund and 
apply only to countries affected by the crisis. See Goodhart and Schoenmaker 
(2008) for an extensive discussion of these two different alternatives. 
(2)  See, for instance, the fourth principle of the Council of the European Union 
(2007) that says burden sharing should take account of home and host countries’ 
supervisory powers. However, the principle does not establish a rule but only lists 
some criteria that could be taken into account in a burden-sharing agreement. 
(3)  Schinasi (2007) uses the “economics of alliances” to assess the European 
architecture. He finds that in contexts where domestic authorities are individually 
responsible for financial stability, small countries may tend to free ride on the 
efforts of large countries to provide financial stability. Schinasi (2007) suggests 
therefore that using GDP in a burden-sharing formula would benefit large 
countries at the expense of smaller countries.130
suggest applying a GDP-based key if the burden-sharing 
is structured as a general fund. 
Specific features of the credit institution requiring assis-
tance may also be integrated into the rule. Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker (2006) discuss for instance the possibility of 
including variables such as (risk-weighted) assets, deposits 
or even the income of the ailing institution in each of the 
countries in which it is present. The objective of these spe-
cific variables would be to capture the relative presence of 
the institution, its systemic nature and the risk associated 
with its presence in each of the countries in which it oper-
ates. The list of possible variables capturing these factors 
is long and could be subject to heavy debate. 
Choosing the variables to incorporate into the burden-
sharing  rule  is  a  key  element  of  the  process,  since,  as 
mentioned above, they can have an impact on the behav-
iour of authorities in normal times. Because the rule is 
determined  ex-ante,  participants  in  the  burden-sharing 
agreement will know in advance which criteria will influ-
ence the final cost allocation. Although – by assumption – 
this will not affect the choice of the crisis resolution policy, 
it may well affect the way authorities behave in normal 
times. If participants know in advance the factors that will 
determine the final burden they will have to bear, they 
may, in non-crisis periods, try to take actions to minimise 
the influence of these factors. For instance, authorities in 
one country could encourage banks to reallocate some of 
their assets or liabilities to their entities in other countries 
in  order  to  limit  the  potential  burden  the  first  country 
would have to bear in the event of a crisis. From an eco-
nomic point of view, the efficiency of such reallocations 
may be questionable.  
As has been noted above, a crucial assumption in this 
section is that the optimal crisis resolution policy can be 
enforced. The implementation of a burden-sharing rule 
in a situation where this condition is violated could have 
significant negative consequences in terms of incentives 
to  act  during  the  crisis,  especially  if  there  is  a  strong 
divergence between the burden allocation resulting from 
the  rule  and  the  burden  allocation  under  the  optimal 
resolution policy. In such cases, authorities may lack the 
incentives to cooperate, and the optimal resolution policy 
would not be implemented.
This  problem  may  remain  limited  if  the  correlation 
between the part of the burden allocated and the poten-
tial total welfare loss is positive for each authority, e.g. if 
an authority contributes more when the impact in its own 
country is greater and less when the impact in its own 
country is limited. In this case, the burden-sharing rule is 
more likely to be acceptable for every authority. However, 
some rules may have counter-productive effects if they do 
not guarantee this positive correlation ; e.g. if one or sev-
eral authorities, as in the example described above, have 
to bear a substantial burden, while in practice they are not 
affected by the crisis. In such a case, these countries may 
want to deviate from the optimal resolution policy, or may 
want to impede a solution that would be detrimental for 
them, e.g. by issuing an opinion on the crisis that would 
be  radically  different  from  the  opinion  of  their  peers. 
Therefore, using an ex-ante burden-sharing rule when the 
choice and implementation of the crisis resolution policy 
depends on the cost allocation can be counter-productive 
(see also Cihák and Decressin, 2007). In such a case, the 
respective  objectives  of  the  crisis-management  frame-
work – namely to minimise the global losses – and of the 
burden-sharing agreement – e.g. to reallocate the costs of 
the crisis according to pre-specified criteria – will differ. No 
one can guarantee in this case that the ultimate objective 
of  the  crisis-management  framework  will  prevail,  since 
the choice of the crisis resolution policy will be influenced 
by the final cost allocation that is imposed by the burden-
sharing scheme. 
Conclusions and policy implications
The objective of this article is to define the various possible 
burden-sharing agreements and to investigate the condi-
tions in which they could be applied. The article makes a 
distinction between the agreement on a burden-sharing 
principle, in which authorities commit themselves to shar-
ing the burden of the crisis without specifying ex-ante a 
cost allocation, and the agreement on a burden-sharing 
rule,  in  which  the  future  cost  allocation  is  determined 
ex ante, on the basis of pre-specified criteria. The article 
shows that each of these two agreements has a different 
objective. It also demonstrates that they respond to differ-
ent concerns, but also correspond to different institutional 
environment. Indeed, when the optimal crisis resolution 
policy cannot be enforced by an independent authority, 
agreement on a burden-sharing principle should be pre-
ferred, as it can serve as a device to align the interests of 
all authorities. On the other hand, when the burden-shar-
ing is disconnected from the choice of the optimal crisis 
resolution policy, e.g. when the optimal resolution policy 
can be enforced, the final cost allocation, by assumption, 
does not influence the management of the crisis and can 
consequently be determined beforehand. Obviously, the 
outcome of each of these two types of burden-sharing 
schemes – e.g. the final cost allocation between different 
countries – will differ substantially. 
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In the present European environment, national authori-
ties – which are in charge of the assessment of the crisis 
and of the choice and implementation of the resolution 
policy – are also footing the bill for the crisis. Therefore, 
the final allocation of the costs of the crisis is likely to 
affect the choice and implementation of the crisis resolu-
tion policy. Authorities in Europe wishing to implement a 
burden-sharing agreement thus have the choice between 
two  alternatives,  namely  either  concluding  an  agree-
ment  on  a  burden-sharing  principle  only  or  modifying 
the institutional structure to guarantee that the optimal 
crisis resolution policy can be identified and enforced and 
that the final cost allocation will not influence its choice. 
The choice of one of these two alternatives by authorities 
desiring  to  negotiate  a  burden-sharing  agreement  will 
depend on the objective they assign to it. If authorities 
need  a  coordination  mechanism,  they  should  acknowl-
edge  that  an  agreement  on  a  burden-sharing  rule  will 
be  incompatible  with  this  objective  and  should  not  be 
pursued. If, on the other hand, they want to implement 
a burden-sharing agreement to modify the eventual cost 
allocation according to normative criteria, then they need 
to develop a framework that will guarantee that the opti-
mal resolution policy can be enforced.  
However, authorities wishing to implement a burden-shar-
ing agreement will face another difficulty as the outcome 
of a burden-sharing agreement will remain subject to a 
series of uncertainties. First, there are some legal uncer-
tainties. Authorities willing to agree on a burden-sharing 
mechanism  ex-ante  have  to  carefully  review  these  legal 
uncertainties, which will depend on their domestic context. 
The  procedure  of  committing  public  funds,  even  if  this 
commitment concerns future resources and is contingent 
on the occurrence of a crisis, may require parliamentary 
approval or may be subject to another form of decision 
making. Legal uncertainties not only concern the ex-ante 
agreement but also its ex-post enforcement. The legal form 
that the agreement takes will also influence enforcement. 
There will also be uncertainties surrounding the assess-
ment of the nature of the crisis and especially its potential 
consequences in terms of welfare losses. Since potential 
welfare losses are difficult to calculate, some uncertain-
ties may remain on the crisis resolution policy to choose. 
The behaviour of authorities in a crisis context may also 
be difficult to anticipate as it will be influenced by both 
domestic and cross-border elements that may be difficult 
to apprehend beforehand.  
Finally, even if the latter elements were perfectly predict-
able,  a  crisis  context  remains  by  definition  uncertain. 
Authorities  starting  to  cooperate  with  foreign  counter-
parts do not know ex-ante what their final contribution 
will be as the crisis unfolds. A crisis may actually start with 
a fairly benign situation which then deteriorates. In that 
context, authorities starting to cooperate may fear that a 
binding burden-sharing rule would constrain their ability 
to manage the crisis or may involve far more resources 
than initially expected. 
Considering  all  these  uncertainties,  any  burden-sharing 
agreement should rest on robust foundations that are sol-
idly anchored in the institutional framework. For instance, 
authorities  wanting  to  adopt  a  burden-sharing  agree-
ment should make sure that the decision-making process 
during  the  crisis  is  clearly  set  out  and  that  a  common 
opinion on the policy response required to solve the crisis 
can be rapidly determined by the authorities in charge 
of crisis management. In the absence of a coordinated 
policy response, the successful application of a burden-
sharing  mechanism  is  very  unlikely.  However,  currently, 
the European framework for crisis management is lacking 
a mechanism guaranteeing that authorities can reach a 
common opinion on a crisis resolution policy in a short 
space of time.
All preconditions for an efficient burden-sharing agree-
ment  are  therefore  currently  not  met.  However,  they 
serve  as  a  good  benchmark  for  future  regulatory  ini-
tiatives. To that extent, improving cooperation between 
authorities, and in particular investigating whether the 
framework  for  reaching  a  common  opinion  on  crisis 
resolution  can  be  implemented,  seem  to  be  the  most 
important elements on which authorities should focus 
for the moment. 132
References
ˇ Cihák M. and J. Decressin (2007), “The Case for a European Banking Charter”, IMF Working Paper, 07 / 173.
Council of the European Union (2007), “Council Conclusions on Enhancing the Arrangements for Financial Stability in 
the EU – Press Release”, 9 October. 
Council  of  the  European  Union  (2008),  “Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  Cooperation  between  the  Financial 
Supervisory Authorities, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union on Cross-border Financial Stability 
– Press release”, 4 April.
Fonteyne W. (2007), “Options for Faster Financial Integration”, IMF Survey, 36, 5, 76-77.
Fonteyne W. (2008), “Crisis Resolution and Burden-sharing for Cross-border Systemic EU banks”, IMF Working Paper 
(Forthcoming). 
Freixas X. (2003), “Crisis Management in Europe”, in Financial Supervision in Europe, ed. by Kremers J., D. Schoenmaker 
and P. Wiert, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Goodhart C. and D. Schoenmaker (2006), “Burden-sharing in a Banking Crisis in Europe”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic 
Review, 2, 34-57.
Goodhart C. and D. Schoenmaker (2008), “Fiscal Burden-sharing in Cross-border Banking Crises”, Mimeo, London 
School of Economics. 
International Monetary Fund (2007), “Euro Area Policies : 2007 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report ; Staff Supplement ; 
Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion ; and Statement by the Executive Director for Member 
Countries”, IMF Country Report N°07 / 260.
Nieto M. and G. Schinasi (2008), “EU Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability : Towards an Analytical Benchmark 
for Assessing its Effectiveness”, Banco de Espana Working Paper, 0801.
Nguyen G. and P. Praet (2006), “Cross-border Crisis Management : a race against the Clock or a Hurdle Race ?”, Financial 
Stability Review, 151-173.
Schinasi  G.  (2007),  “Resolving  EU  Financial-Stability  Challenges :  Is  a  Decentralized-Making  Approach  Efficient ?”, 
Mimeo, IMF. 